










The Effect of Restrictive Bank Lending on Innovation: 





















An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the Ifo website 
www.cesifo-group.de. Ifo Working Paper No. 109 
The Effect of Restrictive Bank Lending on Innovation: 
Evidence from a Financial Crisis* 
Abstract 
 
Using unique micro-data on German firms, this paper estimates the effect of restrictive 
bank lending on innovation. In the German three-pillar banking system, comprised of 
commercial banks, credit unions, and savings banks, firms were differently affected in 
their ability to raise external debt during the financial crisis depending on the pillar to 
which their main relationship bank belonged. Using this institutional feature as an 
instrument for credit access reveals that restrictive bank lending increases a firm’s 
probability of discontinuing innovation projects by 21.6 percentage points. 
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Does restrictive bank lending reduce innovation activity? If the answer is “yes,” then a 
relatively short period of financial distress could have important implications for long-term 
growth. When identifying the effect of external finance on innovation, however, it is 
insufficient to simply rely on the actual use of external finance as a measure for credit access. 
This rather captures the equilibrium between demand and final supply of external funds and is 
therefore highly endogenous to the characteristics of the firm, those of the bank, and other 
factors unobservable to the researcher (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Additional external finance 
enables firms to increase their R&D and develop new technologies, but new technologies also 
induce more R&D and increase the need for external finance. The ultimate goal is to 
successfully isolate the supply effect (Brown et al. 2009). 
This paper exploits an institutional feature of the German banking system that led to variation 
in firms’ credit access during the recent financial crisis depending on whether their main 
relationship bank is a commercial bank or a credit union. This variation can be used in an 
instrumental variables approach with a difference-in-difference-like first stage to estimate the 
causal effect of restrictive bank lending on innovation. 
In the first phase of the financial crisis, only financial markets were affected and real 
economy effects had not yet occurred. Banks had to write off massive amounts of money and 
reduce the active positions in their balance sheets. However, not all banks were hit equally 
hard. The German banking system is based on three pillars: commercial banks, credit unions, 
and savings banks. The three types engage in significantly different business practices. This 
paper focuses on the difference between commercial banks and credit unions as it is the most 
pronounced. Credit unions do not invest in foreign assets to the same extent as commercial 
banks because they are legally bound to foster their members, which usually reside in the 
same region as the credit union. They also obtain a larger fraction of their capital directly 
from savings accounts, which are a rather cheap and stable method of refinancing. This, 
importantly, continues to function even when the interbank market collapses, on which 
commercial banks primarily rely to refinance their operations. These institutional features 
mean that credit unions did not have to shrink their balance sheets and reduce their lending 
during the financial crisis to the same extent as did commercial banks. 
During this first phase of the financial crisis, firms were not affected in their daily operations 
except in regard to external capital generation. Given the strong and stable relationship 
1between a firm and its main bank in Germany, firms are affected in their ability to raise 
external debt to the same degree that their main bank is affected by the financial crisis. 
The ifo business survey collects direct information about a bank’s lending situation, as well as 
information about its main bank relation and its innovation activity. This information provides 
a unique opportunity to assess the effect of restrictive bank lending directly without having to 
use proxies to define a firm as credit constrained. In an instrumental variable (IV) setting we 
can use differences in the development of a firm’s individual bank lending situation during 
the financial crisis depending on whether its main relationship bank is a commercial bank or a 
credit union to causally estimate the effect of restrictive lending on innovation activity. The 
panel structure of the dataset lets us follow individual firms over several years and also allows 
for the inclusion of individual firm fixed effects. 
The results provide first evidence that a relatively short period of restrictive bank lending has 
long-term consequences for an economy through the channel of reduced innovation activity. 
In an environment of restrictive bank lending, firms are 21.6 percentage points more likely to 
discontinue an already ongoing innovation activity, a finding that should be taken into 
consideration by any politician or decision maker dealing with a financial crisis. This effect is 
much larger than indicated by simple OLS estimation and can be interpreted in a causal way 
under the assumption of parallel trends in innovation activity by firms with a commercial 
bank relationship and those with a credit union as their main bank, in absence of the financial 
crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the 
literature relevant to this article. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 provides a first 
starting point by estimating a simple OLS model. Section 5 introduces the identification 
strategy; the results are presented in Section 6. Several robustness tests are conducted in 





22)  Finance and Innovation 
 
How the financial system affects long-term growth is a topic of ongoing debate in the 
literature. Some economists are of the opinion that the financial system is not at all important 
for growth (Lucas 1988) and that it is the economic development that causes the development 
of the financial system (Robinson 1952). However, many economists are convinced that the 
financial system plays a critical role in generating growth as only the financial system can 
transform savers’ liquidity into long-term capital investments (Hicks 1969; Bagehot 1973; 
Schumpeter 1912). 
The last few years have seen more of a consensus among economists that an economy’s long-
term growth is indeed influenced by the financial system (Levine 2005). In growth models 
such as those of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), the financial system can influence steady-state growth through altering the rate of 
technological innovation. An extensive overview of the channels through which the financial 
system influences long-term growth is provided in Levine (1997). As to empirical evidence 
on the subject, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) use a cross-section of 80 countries to 
investigate whether financial development affects growth. In their studies, all indicators of 
financial development are significantly associated with growth. To evaluate the direction of 
causality, the authors use lagged development of the financial system and show that the 
financial depth in 1960 can predict economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity 
improvements for the next 30 years. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that capital-dependent 
industries evolve more successfully in countries having better developed financial systems. 
They argue that the main driver of such a phenomenon is that in such countries, investment 
opportunities are more easily identified. 
Another important effect of a well-developed financial system is the mediation of economic 
cycles. Aghion et al. (2011) state that investment is pro-cyclical under credit constraints but 
countercyclical in their absence, a result confirming the findings of Fazzari et al. (1988). This 
effect is strongest in sectors that rely heavily on external finance. The R&D investment share 
in credit-constrained firms falls during recessions, but does not increase to the same degree 
during upswings. In an instrumental variable approach similar to the one used in this paper, 
Paravisini et al. (2011) find a significant negative effect of reduced bank credit supply on 
international trade for a large sample of Peruvian firms. 
 
3The effects of macroeconomic instability, such as instabilities stemming from the financial 
system, are well studied when it comes to productivity, firm survival, health, mortality, and 
crime, but little is known about the consequences of instability for technological discovery 
(Lamoreaux and Levenstein 2011). Savignac (2008) finds a negative relationship between 
financial constraints and innovation after controlling for whether the firms actually intend to 
be innovators, using a French dataset that includes direct measures for credit constraints. 
Benfratello et al. (2008) confirm a positive influence of bank development in Italy, proxied by 
branch density, on innovation, which is most pronounced for sectors with greater need for 
external capital. Using a firm panel covering many countries and using, among other 
measures, overdue payments to suppliers as an instrument for credit constraints, 
Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) find that financial constraints restrain the innovation 
activity of domestically owned firms and prevent them from catching up to the technological 
frontier. Campello et al’s (2010) international survey of more than 1,000 chief financial 
officers finds that during the financial crisis, financially constrained firms tended to plan 
deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital investment and that most of them had 
to forego attractive investment opportunities due to their inability to raise external capital. 
This inability seems to be mainly driven by quantity constraints and only to a lesser extent by 
price constraints. 
 
To date, most empirical studies on the topic use proxies for firms’ credit constraints. Only 
very seldom are direct measures available (Savignac 2008). Fazzari et al. (1988) define firms 
as being credit constrained when they pay no dividends, a situation that is assumed to arise 
because the firms need all available money for their own survival. Hall and van Reenen 
(2000) look at R&D induced by tax changes and find a stimulating effect of tax credits on 
R&D, with an elasticity around unity. Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) use overdue 
payments to suppliers as an instrument for credit constraints. In this paper, we follow 
Savignac (2008) and Campello et al. (2010) and use a direct measure of firm’s credit 
constraint. This method overcomes measurement problems and allows for a straightforward 
interpretation of the results. 
Also, the issue of the direction of causality is still not completely resolved in the literature. On 
the one hand, financial development might cause innovation and growth; on the other hand, 
the financial system might develop in anticipation of future innovation and growth. Even 
though some studies tackle endogeneity quite well, such as Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer 
(2010), further causal evidence is needed on this issue. 
4Firms usually have many possible ways of financing innovation activity; bank finance is not 
the only way of raising external capital. There is disagreement in the literature as to whether 
firms should use equity or debt to finance innovation activity (Hellmann and Stiglitz 2000; 
Ueda 2004). However, evidence suggests that bank finance plays at least some role in 
innovation financing. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), there is a sort of financing 
preference “pecking order.” Firms prefer to finance their innovations through internal cash 
flows. If those are insufficient, firms prefer debt over equity because ownership control can be 
retained. If debt financing is not feasible, firms are forced to give up a certain amount of 
control and their (potentially high) future earnings in a bid to obtain equity financing. The 
same order of preferences is postulated by Bolton and Freixas (2000). According to them, 
entrepreneurs generally prefer debt finance but are often turned down by banks and have no 
choice other than turning to equity financing. Small firms are especially dependent on bank 
finance. Sharma (2007) finds that R&D in small firms is associated with bank development 
but not with measures of stock market development. 
In Germany, bank finance plays a large role in innovation financing. This is because the 
relations between firms and their main banks are usually very close. It is due to these intense 
and long-lasting bank-firm relationships, during which banks acquire an enormous amount of 
knowledge about a firm’s potential, that banks are willing to provide credit, even for risky 
innovation projects. The literature generally confirms the importance of an intense bank-firm 
relationship for the availability of credit (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan 1994; 
Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998). Furthermore, the German tax system 
allows deduction of rent payments but not deduction of fictive rent payments to equity, a 
system that makes debt finance favorable (Hall 2009). Spielkamp and Rammer (2009) show 
that apart from internal finance, which is always preferred and used to the extent possible, a 
higher percentage of German innovative enterprises use debt finance (44 percent) than equity 
finance (25 percent). 
In summary, it seems that bank finance plays a major role in the financing of innovation 
activity, especially, but not exclusively, for small and medium-sized firms. This paper 
concentrates on bank finance to evaluate the effect of credit constraints on innovation, but it is 
important to keep in mind that other financial instruments are available to firms, even though 
they seem most important for very large businesses. However, as the conclusions drawn in 
this paper are of a general nature, the source of the exogenous variation in external capital is 
of only minor concern. 
 
53)  Firm-Level Data on Financing Constraints and Innovation 
 
The dataset used in this paper builds on the Ifo Business Survey, which is conducted monthly 
by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich for the purpose of making predictions 
about the German business climate. The Ifo Business Survey dataset includes data on the 
manufacturing, construction, and services sectors, but this paper focuses exclusively on the 
manufacturing sector. Every month, around 3,000 manufacturing firms report their current 
business situation as well as their expected business situation. Firms have the opportunity to 
answer the survey either online or in a paper-based format. The panel spans many decades, 
thus guaranteeing a solid database that is remarkably representative of the German economy. 
In addition to the business situation variables, this paper uses some special questions that are 
included in the Ifo Business Survey. Each December, firms are questioned about their 
innovative activity in the preceding year. They are asked to indicate whether they realized an 
innovation, discontinued an innovation activity, have finished planning an innovation, are 
currently planning an innovation, or do not intend to innovate at all. The question is asked 
separately for process and product innovations. Since 2003, firms have been asked to give an 
appraisal of the current bank lending situation. Firms state whether they perceive banks’ 
willingness to provide credit to firms as accommodating, normal, or restrictive.
1 The question 
was initially asked twice a year, beginning in June 2003, but has been included in the regular 
monthly set of questions since November 2008. Figure 1 shows the fraction of all answering 
firms over time that perceived the lending situation as restrictive. This indicator is known as 
the Ifo Credit Constraint Indicator. Obviously, the financial crises, which started in August 
2007 with the subprime crisis and peaked with the Lehman Brothers’ insolvency in 2008, had 
huge effects on the lending behavior of banks in Germany. On aggregate, manufacturing firms 
in Germany face a lending situation since the crisis that is worse than before the crisis. 
 
  
                                                 
1 The English translation of the German question is: “How would you assess the current willingness of banks to 
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7between the lending behavior of credit unions and commercial banks in this paper, because 
this is the most clear-cut difference, firms with more than 1,000 employees are again not 
particularly useful for our identification strategy. Additionally, firms with more than 1,000 
employees are most likely able to obtain financing through channels other than the bank 
market. Restricting our sample to firms with less than 1,000 employees assures that firms are 
actually relying on bank finance to a large extent. 
About 79 percent of all firms in the dataset are located in the western federal states of 
Germany. On average, 64 percent of firms are innovators, with at least one realized 
innovation during the year. The sample firms’ average sales volume is around 35.5 million 
Euros. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
N  firms  mean min  max 
bank lending is restrictive  16460  3732  0.413  0  1 
innovation realized  10790  2849  0.643  0  1 
… process innovation realized  10790  2849  0.429  0  1 
… product innovation realized  10790  2849  0.553  0  1 
innovation discontinued  10790  2849  0.033  0  1 
… process innovation discontinued  10790  2849  0.018  0  1 
… product innovation discontinued  10790  2849  0.022  0  1 
employees 17905  3881  195.5  1  1000 
not exporting  17881  3881  0.237  0  1 
west 17905  3881  0.790  0  1 
demand situation  17902  3881  -0.026  -1  1 
state of business (current)  17903  3881  -0.043  -1  1 
state of business (expected)  17889  3880  0.011  -1  1 
sales (mil. Euros)  4537  1616  35.55  0  4924.03 
main bank is…   
… credit union  11413  2040  0.202  0  1 
… savings bank  11413  2040  0.409  0  1 
… federal state bank  11413  2040  0.069  0  1 
… commercial bank  11413  2040  0.338  0  1 
… other  11413  2040  0.099  0  1 
Source: Ifo Business Survey waves 2003–2009, averages of annually aggregated values, own calculations. 
 
This paper uses the 2003 to 2009 waves to estimate the effect of restrictive bank lending on 
innovation. This sample period shows clear variation in the financial market that can be used 
for identification. All monthly data are aggregated on an annual basis. Simple average values 
are computed for employees, sales, and the reported demand situation, as well as for the 
current and expected state of business. The binary variable indicating whether bank lending is 
reported to be restrictive or not takes the value of 1 if a firm reports a restrictive lending 
situation at least once in the corresponding year. Due to the identification strategy, which is 
explained in greater detail in Section 5, we use only those firms that report either a 
commercial bank or a credit union as their main bank. As a result, the final estimation sample 
8is an unbalanced panel comprised of 772 firms that can be observed, on average, over 4.6 
years. 
 
To capture any immediate impact of restrictive bank lending on innovation, a highly 
responsive measure is needed. This paper uses discontinued innovation activity as the main 
outcome variable. This binary variable is among the first measures to react to severe 
restrictions stemming from the financial sector and takes the value of 1 if a firm reports that it 
discontinued an innovation activity during the reporting period. This enables us to observe 
and identify a direct and immediate effect of restrictive bank lending. Discontinuing an 
innovation activity implies that resources were sunk into the activity without producing any 
valuable results, which is not only inefficient and growth reducing for the individual firm but 
for the whole economy. 
Usually, patent counts or direct survey measures for introduced innovations are used to 
measure effects on innovation activity. However, for a couple of reasons, neither is well 
suited to this study. Patents usually take quite some time before they are granted and thus 
patent statistics are not a good contemporaneous indicator of a firm’s current innovation 
activity. Additionally, patents capture inventions, not necessarily innovations, as it is not 
entirely clear whether the patented product or process will actually be used by the firm or 
whether the patent has only been obtained to gain leverage against competitors. Direct 
measures for successfully introduced innovations, which are also available in the Ifo Business 
Survey, suffer from the same lag problem as patent counts. Innovations usually need time to 
be developed to the extent where they can be introduced. Using successfully introduced 
innovations as an outcome measure would most likely prevent the identification of immediate 
effects of restrictive bank lending and only identify the effect of past bank lending. 
Only a measure of starting an innovation, as it is available in the Ifo Innovation Survey, 
would also serve the purpose to identify immediate effects. The Ifo Innovation Survey is a 
special survey which is carried out annually at the Ifo Institute to assess the innovation 
activity of firms in even greater detail. Firms participating in the innovation survey can be 
matched with their corresponding records in the business survey, given that they have 
responded to both surveys. We use this measure as a robustness test at a later stage to verify 
our results. Unfortunately, this measure is available for only a small number of firms in our 
sample and therefore the statistical power of this model is somewhat limited. 
 
94)  The Association Between Restrictive Bank Lending and Discontinued 
Innovations 
 
A simple OLS model is used to provide a starting point for the investigation into the effect of 
restrictive bank lending on innovation. Column 1 in Table 2 shows the estimation results for 
the simplest OLS estimation. We identify a positive coefficient of 0.0128, which is significant 
at the usual levels. A restrictive lending situation is associated with a 1.28 percentage point 
increase in the probability of discontinuing an innovation. In this setting, we control for time 
fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the two-digit NACE level, and size class fixed effects, 
as is the case for all regressions in this paper. In Column 2, we further control for possible real 
economy effects in order to isolate the effect stemming from the financial system. We include 
the reported demand situation compared to the preceding quarter (better, unchanged, worse), a 
binary indicator for whether a firm exports any goods, a binary indicator for whether a firm is 
located in the western part of Germany, and the current state of business (good, satisfying, 
bad), as well as the expected state of business for the next six months (more favorable, 
unchanged, less favorable). Including these controls does not much change the results. 
 
Table 2: OLS results  










restrictive lending  0.0128***  0.00951**  0.00398  0.00595* 
[0.00444] [0.00444]  [0.00357]  [0.00312] 
west -  -0.00551  0.000945  -0.00795 
[0.0105] [0.00794]  [0.00811] 
not exporting  -  -0.00204  0.000276  -0.00644 
[0.00744] [0.00612]  [0.00457] 
demand situation  -  -0.00589  -0.00393  -0.00279 
[0.00423] [0.00336]  [0.00304] 
state of business  -  -0.0113***  -0.00719**  -0.00641** 
[0.00365] [0.00294]  [0.00267] 
state of business (expected)  -  -0.00352 -0.00232  -0.00475 
[0.00417] [0.00332]  [0.00296] 
R-squared 0.013  0.016  0.012  0.012 
observations 10246  10238  10238  10238 
firms 2764  2764  2764  2764 
Notes: OLS estimation on the basis of the Ifo Business Survey. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
in brackets. Fixed effects for years, two-digit industry code, and size class included in all specifications. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The outcome variable can be further split into discontinued product and process innovations. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show the results for those two refined outcome measures. The 
effect is pronounced and statistically significant for discontinued process innovations, but 
insignificant for product innovations. 
10However, the OLS effects are subject to many caveats. First, reverse causality is likely 
prevalent. Firms reporting restrictive bank lending might actually have trouble obtaining bank 
credit because they discontinue their innovation activity. They might also be unable to obtain 
bank credit simply because they are trying to innovate, which is a risky business in itself. In 
these situations, the effect of restrictive bank lending on innovation would be overestimated in 
the OLS model. However, it might also be that firms that discontinue innovations but at least 
try to innovate are seen as having the potential for success in the future and therefore are 
given better access to credit. In this situation, the OLS model would underestimate the true 
effect of restrictive bank lending. These problems are partially circumvented by the design of 
the data. Firms are asked about the general willingness of banks to provide credit to 
businesses in general and not explicitly about banks’ willingness to provide credit to them. 
Thus, even firms that individually face restrictive access to bank credit might report the 
situation as not restrictive if they are aware of other firms successfully obtaining credit. 
Nevertheless, the problem is not completely solved. 
The second source of potential bias in the OLS estimation is selection bias. On the one hand, 
firms reporting restrictive bank lending might be a selected group concerning their innovation 
activities or, on the other hand, firms reporting discontinued innovations might be a selected 
group concerning their external debt situation. For instance, firms discontinuing innovation 
projects might need less external finance as a result and therefore not report that lending is 
restricted. In this case, the OLS model would underestimate the effect of restrictive bank 
lending on discontinued innovation. 
Another source of bias might be omitted variables that influence both the discontinuing of 
innovations as well as the perceived and reported bank lending situation and that are 
unobservable by the researcher; for example, the risk averseness of a firm’s management. If 
management is especially risk averse, the firm might discontinue innovation projects more 
often but might also enjoy a more favorable lending situation. A bank would know that its 
investment in the firm can most likely be recouped as the firm’s management is not going to 
make any overly risky decisions. This would lead the OLS model to underestimate the true 
effect of restrictive bank lending on innovation activity. Finally, systematic measurement 
error in the reported restrictive lending variable could play a role if firms that discontinue 
their innovations have a different perception of the lending situation than firms that do not 
discontinue their innovations. To tackle these potential biases we need an identification 
strategy that utilizes exogenous variation in the restrictive lending variable. 
 
115)  A Unique Variation of Credit Provision in the German Banking Sector During 
the Financial Crisis 
 
Traditionally, the banking system in Germany is divided into three pillars: the commercial 
banking sector, the credit union sector (Genossenschaftsbanken), and the savings banks sector 
(Sparkassen). Credit unions and savings banks differ from their commercial counterparts in 
their commitment to promote regional businesses and regional growth. However, this paper 
focuses on the difference between commercial banks and credit unions as this is most clear 
cut. 
Credit unions are community-based banks organized in a cooperative structure. They are 
owned and controlled by their members in a one-member-one-vote system. Usually, only 
members are allowed to receive a loan from a credit union or deposit money in it. As a 
consequence, credit unions have always been committed to provide superior services to their 
members and help them prosper economically. Even by law, credit unions are obligated to act 
in a manner that will foster the prosperity of their members.
4 As members usually reside in the 
same region where the credit union is located, this induces a regional dimension to all the 
credit union’s actions. Credit unions were originally developed in Germany during the 19
th 
century by Herman Schulze-Delitzsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen. Schulze-Delitzsch 
created his first credit unions in cities; Raiffeisen focused on the rural parts of the country. 
Credit unions served all classes of people, including the middle class and the poor, which was 
not the case for the typical commercial bank at that time. The regional dimension, as well as 
their ownership structure, means that credit unions tend to invest in regional projects and do 
not engage in risky projects in foreign countries. Consequently, one would expect them to 
have been hit the least hard by the financial crisis that originated in the U.S. real estate 
market. 
The main goal of credit unions is to foster their members and, at least in comparison to 
commercial banks, not to make profits and expand by any and all means. They also have a 
tightly woven branch network and obtain a large fraction of their financial means through the 
savings deposits of individual persons (see Table 3). Those savings are usually stable and 
rather cheap to finance. Big commercial banks generally do not have such a strong savings 
deposit position and predominantly rely on the interbank market to refinance their operations. 
This works perfectly well in times when banks are willing to lend to each other, but creates 
enormous problems when the interbank market collapses, as it did during the recent financial 
                                                 
4 §1 Genossenschaftsgesetz (credit union law). 
12crisis. The importance of banks’ deposits-to-assets ratio is demonstrated in a recent paper by 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) dealing with bank lending behavior during the financial 
crisis. The authors demonstrate that banks with a deposits-to-assets ratio one standard 
deviation below the mean reduced their loan originations by 49 percent, while banks with a 
deposits-to-assets ratio one standard deviation above the mean reduced their lending by only 
21 percent. The authors further state that banks with a strong deposit base are in the best 
position to continue funding those credit lines during the crisis on which they agreed before 
the crisis. 
 
Table 3: Savings deposits and total lending 
  all banks credit unions big commercial banks 
loans to non-banks (bil. Euro)  3,810,493 411,987 580,961 
… percentage of all loans  100% 10.8% 15.2% 
savings deposits of non-banks (bil. Euro)  588,660 173,364 58,035 
… percentage of all saving deposits  100% 29.5% 9.9% 
saving deposits per loan  15.4% 42.1% 10.0% 
Note: Average values for the period 2003–2010. 
Source: Time series database, Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
This specific feature of the German banking sector leads to an expectation that the different 
pillars of the banking sector do not react in the same way to financial crisis hits. Credit unions 
are bound by duties of loyalty and are deeply integrated into their regional economy. They 
know their customers, their savers, and their businesses, and their customers are, in turn, loyal 
to them. Because credit unions had not invested as much in risky assets prior to the crisis, they 
did not have to write off as much as did commercial banks. They also obtain a large fraction 
of their means from savings deposits, which do not fluctuate much over time. We would 
therefore expect ex ante that the credit union lending reacts less to a crisis than the lending of 
commercial banks. Figure 2 illustrates the declining lending total of commercial banks in 
Germany during the most recent financial crisis. Credit unions, on the other hand, seem to be 
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14Figure 3: Credit constraint indicator split by main bank 
 
Source: Ifo Business Survey, own calculations based on 11,413 observations from 2,040 firms. Only firms with 
less than 1,000 employees are used. 
 
All in all, there is clear variation in firms’ access to credit depending on their main bank 
relation during the crisis. This phenomenon can be used to define a treatment group and a 
control group in order to capture a clear-cut difference in lending behavior caused by an 
exogenous shock. It is assumed that the reported main bank of firms remained unchanged 
during the whole period and we are confident in making this assumption as the main bank 
relation is by definition and by survey question wording a long-lasting relationship that does 
not change frequently. 
The treatment group is comprised of those firms that report only a commercial bank as their 
main bank. These firms are not able to bypass the restrictive credit situation by relying on 
another main bank. They are also unlikely to be able to establish new relations with other 
banks during the crisis as banks in trouble will serve their existing customers first. If a firm is 
not able to obtain credit from its main bank during bad financial times, it is highly unlikely 
that it will find a new bank, with which it has no relationship, willing to provide credit. As the 
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15report having more than one type of main bank, the control group is defined as those firms 
indicating that at least one of their main banks is a credit union. During and after the crisis, 
these firms can obtain credit from their credit union, even though their other main bank(s) 
might cut their credit lines. 
 
Figure 4: Credit constraint indicator split by treatment group status 
 
Source: Ifo Business Survey, own calculations based on 405 firms in the control group and 535 firms in the 
treatment group. Only firms with less than 1,000 employees are used. 
 
Figure 4 graphs the credit constraint indicator split by treatment status.
6 The trend in both 
lines is parallel before the crisis hits. Firms in the control group, i.e., firms with a credit union 
among their main banks, always report a more restrictive lending situation before the crisis 
than do firms in the treatment group, i.e., those firms with a commercial bank as their main 
bank. When the financial crisis erupts, the lines close in on each other and ultimately cross in 
2008. This is mostly because firms in the treatment group report a worsened lending situation, 
while firms in the control group report a nearly unchanged situation. Both lines rise in 2009, 
but the credit situation of the treatment group diverges even more from the control group. 
                                                 
6Again, only firms with fewer than 1,000 employees are included, thus ensuring common support across all size 
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166)  Instrumental Variables Results 
 
This section uses the different development of the lending situation faced by firms with credit 
unions and those with commercial banks as their main bank during the financial crisis to 
instrument the potentially endogenous reported restrictive lending variable in a difference-in-
differences-like first stage. Formally, the following system of equations is estimated: 
 
ε β β β α α     s) I(t * d *     d *     *           LENDING    : stage 1st  3 2 1 t + > + + Χ + + =  
ε δ δ δ α α   LENDING *     d *     *             INNODISC   : stage   2nd 3 2 1 t + + + Χ + + =  
 
where d equals 1 if a firm belongs to the treatment group; 0 otherwise. I is an indicator 
function taking the value of 1 if the year is s or larger; 0 otherwise. The time threshold s, after 
which the treatment group experiences the treatment, is the year 2007, which is the last year 
before the financial crisis started to unfold. α is a constant and αt is a vector of time fixed 
effects. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show the results. Column 1 reports the results without 
controlling for potential real economy effects; Column 2 includes controls for the demand 
situation, the state of business, and exposure to international trade in order to isolate the 
effects stemming from the financial system. After instrumenting the potentially endogenous 
lending variable and controlling for real economy effects, the effect must be interpreted as 
follows: facing restrictive bank lending leads to an increase in a firm’s probability of 
discontinuing an innovation activity by 19.4 percentage points. 
 
  
17Table 4: IV Results 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
dependent variable: 




RE RE  FE  FE FE 
restrictive lending  0.181***  0.194*** 0.216**  0.224**  -0.0115 
[0.0553] [0.0585] [0.107] [0.104]  [0.0685] 
treatment group  0.0239***  0.0242***  -  -  - 
 [0.00520]  [0.00503]       
not exporting  -  -0.00274  0.0288  0.0256  0.001000 
[0.0138] [0.0221] [0.0189]  [0.00938] 
demand situation  -  -0.0325**  -0.00452 -0.00656  0.00503 
[0.0126] [0.00402] [0.00507]  [0.00350] 
state of business  -  -0.00348  0.00235  0.0115  -0.0116** 
[0.00494] [0.00856] [0.00821]  [0.00458] 
state of business (expected)  -  0.0150 0.00203  0.000872  -0.00559 
[0.00969] [0.00267] [0.00314]  [0.00425] 
firm fixed effects  -  -  yes  yes  yes 
observations 3544  3541  3541  3541  3541 
number of firms  772  772  772  772  772 
first stage   
treatment group*post-treatment  0.122*** 0.118***  0.114***  0.114***  0.114*** 
[0.0253] [0.0246]  [0.0230]  [0.0230]  [0.0230] 
first stage F (excluded instrument)  36.70  34.79  24.7  24.7  24.7 
2SLS estimation. Columns 1 and 2 report random effect models, Columns 3–5 report fixed effects models. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the “main-bank” level in brackets. Standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap 
replications in fixed effects models; Fixed effects for year, industry, and size range included in all specifications. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, individual firm heterogeneity still might be driving the results. To rule this out, 
individual firm fixed effects can be added to the model. This leads us to estimate the 
following system of equations in which individual firm fixed effects are captured by the αf: 
ε β β α α α     s) I(t * d *     *           LENDING    : stage 1st  2 1 f t + > + Χ + + + =  
ε δ δ α α α   LENDING *     *             INNODISC   : stage   2nd 2 1 f t + + Χ + + + =  
The identified effect in the second stage, after taking care of firm heterogeneity by including 
firm fixed effects, is about 23 times larger than the one in the simple OLS model. Restrictive 
bank lending is associated with a 21.6 percentage point increase in the probability of 
discontinuing an innovation (Column 3). The effect seems to be mainly driven by the 
discontinuing product innovations (Column 4); the effect on discontinuing process 
innovations is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant (Column 5). This 
demonstrates that estimating the effect of restrictive lending on innovation by means of a 
simple OLS regression suffers from a huge endogeneity bias. Another reason for the 
discrepancy between OLS and IV could be measurement error in the restrictive lending 
variable, which is an admittedly crude measure. The IV identification strategy might isolate 
that part of the variation in the reported variable that is substantial. 
18The difference-in-differences-like first stage seems to provide a valid instrument for 
restrictive bank lending in all specifications. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
treatment group status and post-crisis period is highly significant and reasonably large in 
magnitude. Compared to firms having a commercial bank as their main bank, firms with a 
credit union as their main bank show a decrease in the probability of reporting a restrictive 
bank lending situation of around 11.5 percentage points during the crisis. 
 
Some additional insights can be gained by applying the same methodology to different 
outcome measures.
7 Using the Ifo Innovation Survey, which is an even more detailed survey 
of innovation activity by German manufacturing firms, we can look at the effect of restrictive 
bank lending on the probability of starting an innovation. The Ifo Innovation Survey is 
conducted annually on a subsample of firms participating in the Ifo Business Survey. Using a 
measure from this survey sacrifices nearly half of all observations, which results in increased 
standard errors. The point estimate indicates that facing restrictive bank lending decreases the 
probability of starting an innovation by 37 percentage points. Unfortunately, this effect is 
insignificant due to the small sample size, but remains meaningful in its magnitude. 
Moreover, firms may stop engaging in actual innovation activity, but apparently do not 
completely abandon the creative thinking process. When facing a restrictive lending situation, 
the probability of a firm having completed planning an innovation increases by 41.5 
percentage points. This effect is mainly driven by completely planned product innovations 
while there seems to be no such effect for process innovations. There is no effect on the actual 
probability of introducing an innovation, which is as expected as innovations usually take 
quite some time to develop before they are introduced to the market. 
 
All effects identified using this IV approach can be interpreted as causal under the assumption 
of parallel trends across groups in the absence of the treatment, meaning no additional group-
specific shock, aside from the one stemming from the financial system, that influenced 
innovation activity of firms in the one group but not the other. Even though the assumption of 
parallel trends in the absence of treatment is by definition not directly testable, the next 




                                                 
7 Output omitted. Detailed results are available from the author upon request. 
197)  Robustness Checks 
 
Estimating a difference-in-differences-like first stage is open to the claim that it is not a 
difference in the reported lending that is associated with the emergence of the crisis, but some 
simultaneously abrupt change in firm-specific or economy-specific variables. This could even 
lead to different effects of control variables pre and post crisis. To make sure that the model is 
not just picking up some real economy effects under a changing economic situation, but is 
actually capturing the effect stemming from the financial system, we re-estimate our IV 
model including interactions of all controls with the post-treatment period. By doing this, we 
can discover whether the identified effect is actually caused by the financial market crisis and 
not by some systematic jump in the importance of certain control variables at the treatment. 
Formally, we estimate the following system of equations: 
 
ε β β β α α α     s) I(t * d *     s) I(t * X *     *           LENDING    : stage 1st  3 2 1 f t + > + > + Χ + + + =  
ε δ δ δ α α α   LENDING *     s) I(t * X *     *             INNODISC   : stage   2nd 3 2 1 f t + + > + Χ + + + =  
 
This approach leaves only the variation of the LENDING variable explained by the 
instrument that is not already accounted for by any jump in influence of the control variables, 
such as the demand situation or exposure to international trade. The results of the estimation 
are shown in Column 1 of Table 5. The estimated effect of the LENDING variable in the 
second stage even increases compared to our baseline results, while the first stage remains 
highly significant. We could follow this approach to the extreme and include interactions of 
all covariates with the full set of year fixed effects in our model. Even in this setting, the 
instrumental variables approach holds, with a high F statistic of the excluded instrument and a 
virtually unchanged coefficient of the restrictive lending variable in the second stage, which 
remains highly significant (Table 5, Column 2). We also checked whether the estimations lead 
to different results for smaller firms. In a sample restricted to firms with fewer than 500 
employees the results remain unchanged (Table 5, Column 3). 
 
Finally, we are interested in excluding all firms that engage in no innovation whatsoever. In 
the Ifo Innovation Survey, firms report whether they consider innovation necessary. This 
measure contains information beyond the variable in the business survey that asks whether no 
innovations were planned for the period. There is a big difference between not intending to 
engage in innovation at all and not engaging in it because the firm is unable to do so at the 
present time. We can therefore exclude from our sample those firms that do not consider 
20innovation necessary to their business. Doing so does not change the results much. First, 
Column 4 of Table 5 provides the results using only the subsample of firms that answered the 
Ifo Innovation Survey and all the necessary questions in the Ifo Business Survey during the 
sample period. The estimated effects increase slightly compared to our full sample baseline 
IV effect, but standard errors also increase due to the smaller sample size. We lose more than 
half our observations and the effect loses significance. Nevertheless, the point estimate is of 
the same magnitude as before, so the insignificant coefficient is most likely due to small 
sample problems. Column 5 restricts the sample to those firms that did not rule out innovation 
activity because they considered it not necessary. In other words, the firms remaining in the 
sample are the ones that actually want to innovate. The estimated effect increases, as does the 
first-stage coefficient. Even though the differences are not statistically significant, we have 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the IV approach to be convincing, the results should continue to hold in a reduced form 
setting. Figure 5 graphs the development of the final outcome, the discontinued innovation 
variable, for the treatment and the control group. It shows the residuals after controlling for 
time fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and size class fixed effects, as well as interactions of 
size and industry fixed effects with the full set of time dummies. What remains is the variation 
in the innovation discontinued variable that cannot be explained by such fixed effects and 
must be accounted for by other factors, such as the restrictive lending of banks. 
 
Figure 5: Pre-treatment trends in “innovation discontinued” 
 
Source: Ifo Business Survey waves 2003-2009. 
 
With exception of the year 2003, the first year in our sample, we recognize a quite similar 
pattern before 2008 and a diverging development afterwards. Based on this graphical 
evidence, we are confident that the difference-in-differences setting is appropriate for this 
context. Formulated in a regression, we can estimate the reduced form to verify the approach. 
Results are shown in Column 1 of Table 6. The significantly positive coefficient in Column 1 
is interpreted as follows: having a commercial bank as one’s main bank increases the 














































23financial crisis in comparison to firms having a credit union as their main bank. These results 
are in line with our findings in the instrumental variable setting. 
 
Table 6: Reduced form, IV first stage and placebo treatments 
   (1) (2) (3) (5) 
dependent variable:  innovation discontinued 
(reduced form) 
restrictive lending 
(IV first stage) 
treatment group * post-treatment period  0.0296*** - 0.0598***   
  [0.00704]   [0.0160]   
treatment group * year 2003  - 0.00994   -0.00223 
 [0.0151]  [0.0268] 
treatment group * year 2004  - -0.0172    -0.0569 
 [0.0138]  [0.0374] 
treatment group * year 2006  - 0.00426 - 0.000543 
 [0.0115]  [0.0224] 
treatment group * year 2007  - 0.00713 -  0.0424 
   [0.00927]   [0.0262] 
treatment group * year 2008  - 0.0278 - 0.0273 
 [0.0162]  [0.0241] 
treatment group * year 2009  - 0.0338** - 0.0945*** 
 [0.0121]  [0.0199] 
not exporting  0.000961 0.0679*  -0.0670  -0.00855 
[0.0184] [0.0370] [0.0456] [0.0537] 
demand situation  0.0119 0.0322** -0.0197 0.0750* 
[0.00681] [0.0135]  [0.0414]  [0.0341] 
state of business  -0.0303** 0.00711  -0.00550  -0.0709*** 
[0.00957] [0.0153]  [0.0267]  [0.0146] 
state of business (expected)  -0.00643 -0.0213  0.0183  -0.0395 
[0.00456] [0.0267]  [0.0384]  [0.0377] 
interactions: X * year fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
observations  3692 3692 3541 3541 
number of firms  785 785 722 722 
R-squared  0.04 0.041 0.151 0.183 
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors clustered at the “main-bank” level in brackets. Fixed effects for year, 
firm, and size range included in all specifications. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For the difference-in-differences setting in the first stage to be convincing, we need to assume 
similar trends across groups in absence of treatment. By definition this assumption is not 
directly testable. However, we can use the panel structure of the data and look at pre-
treatment trends for an indication of the validity of this assumption. Because the variation 
used for identification in this paper comes from a group-specific jump at one point in time, in 
this special setting we actually want to have similar pre-treatment trends in both the outcome 
variable and the instrumented variable. We further need to check for the correct timing of the 
treatment period. 
24Figures 4 and 5 provide first evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds as well as for 
the correct timing of the treatment period. Additionally, we can estimate a regression that 
includes all possible placebo treatment dummies. To support the treatment period used in this 
paper, all placebo treatments before the actual treatment period should be insignificant. Table 
6 shows the placebo treatments specification results for both the reduced form (Column 2) as 
well as the actual first stage used in the IV approach (Column 4). For both we estimate the 
basic specification with the aggregated treatment effect starting in 2008 for comparative 
reasons (Columns 1 and 3) and the placebo treatment specification including all interactions 
between the treatment group and the complete set of year dummies (Columns 2 and 4). All 
specifications include interactions between all control variables and the full set of time 
dummies to leave only that variation of the outcome variable to be explained by the treatment 
group interactions not already accounted for by any changing influence of the control 
variables over time. 
If the treatment period is chosen correctly and the influence of the treatment is substantial, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms should be significant only during the treatment period. 
For both the reduced form (Column 2) and the actual first stage (Column 4), there is a clear 
tendency in the significance of the interaction terms beginning in the year 2008, with the most 
substantial effect in 2009. This ensures us that the difference-in-differences setting in the first 
stage is appropriate. The variation identified by the interaction term between the treatment 
group and the post-treatment period is indeed substantial and the timing fits the emergence of 
the financial crisis. 
 
  
258)  Conclusion 
 
Does restrictive bank lending result in reduced innovation? According to the results of this 
paper, the answer is “yes.” Using differences in the lending behavior of commercial banks 
and credit unions during the financial crisis as an instrument for restrictive bank lending at the 
firm-level indicates that a relatively short period of financial distress can have important 
implications for long-term growth. 
This paper exploits an institutional feature of the German banking system, which is divided 
into three pillars: commercial banks, credit unions, and savings banks. Each pillar was 
affected differently by the financial crisis due to differences in their business practices. Based 
on information about the strong and stable main bank relation of the firms in our dataset, this 
paper utilizes the fact that the ability of a firm to raise external debt is affected proportionally 
to the degree its main bank is affected by the financial crisis. Commercial banks were hit very 
hard by the financial crisis, had huge difficulties in refinancing themselves on the interbank 
market, and had to reduce their loan originations; credit unions, on the other hand, were 
comparably unaffected by the crisis. Their high deposits-to-assets ratio and their predominant 
focus on the regional market saved them from disaster. Using this as exogenous variation in 
the availability of external debt solved the endogeneity problem usually found when using the 
usual ordinary least squares estimator. The difference-in-differences-like first-stage regression 
is robust and strong and the instrument, constructed from a firm’s bank relation with a 
commercial bank as opposed to a relation with a credit union, appears to be valid. 
A simple OLS model significantly underestimates the effect of restrictive bank lending on 
innovation, which indicates that endogeneity problems are pronounced in this setting. The 
results of the IV approach show that when facing a restrictive lending situation, firms are 21.6 
percentage points more likely to discontinue an already ongoing innovation activity. Product 
innovations are especially prone to discontinuation whereas there seems to be no such effect 
for process innovations. 
Discontinuing an innovation implies sunk costs for the firm as well as for the economy as a 
whole. Furthermore, it inhibits future growth and future international competitiveness. Even a 
relatively short period of restrictive bank lending can lead to the discontinuation of innovation 
projects. This fact has to be taken into account by any politician or international organization 
dealing with a financial crisis as it implies that there will be additional negative long-run 
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